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Sino-Indian War
The Sino-Indian War occurred between the two Asian giants, China and India.
Date October 10 – November 21, 1962Calvin. War was never declared and thus the beginning of the conflict is a matter of dispute. According to James Barnard Calvin\'s Timeline, the first heavy fighting occurred on October 10. Calvin\'s chapter detailing the Border War also begins on October 10. Location North-East Frontier Agency and Aksai Chin Result Chinese military victory. Subsequent Chinese withdrawal to pre-war positions.
Belligerents
PR China	India
Commanders
Zhang Guohua	Brij Mohan Kaul
Strength
80,000H.A.S.C. by United States. Congress. House Committee on Armed Services — 1999, p. 62War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet by Eric S. Margolis, p. 234.
Casualties and losses
Killed 1,460 (Chinese sources)Though Calvin says that no official figures were released by the Chinese, two Chinese sources viz "The Red Walls Witness" 摘自《红墙��录》，当代中国出版社尹家民 pub 2004 and 中�边疆自��击作战� History of the Sino-India Border Self Defensive War PDF pub 1993, give estimates. The Red Walls book puts Chinese casualties at 1,460, while the other puts killed and wounded figure at 2,400. None capturedBoth Maxwell and the official Indian history indicate that Indian forces took no Chinese prisoners during the conflictHowever, there were reports in the media in 2001-03 that 2 Chinese PoWs were being interned at a Mental Hospital in Ranchi, India. These were subsequently repatriated, though the Indian Govt. denied that they were PoWs. However, Chinese media reports say that these two had been classified as Missing-presumed-Dead and declared martyrs in their home village in Sichuan province. Washington Times, World, 2003-07-27. Wounded 569	Killed 3,128 (Indian sources)This tallies closely with the 1383+1696 which Calvin said were killed and missing. This datamined the original Indian Army site for these details. Of these, 2420 were killed in NEFA. Captured 3,123 Wounded 1,697Official GoI answer to a question raised in the Indian Parliament. However, the US Army says Indian wounded were 1047 and attributes it to Indian Defence Ministry\'s 1965 report, but this report also included a lower estimate of killed.

The Sino-Indian War (simplified Chinese: 中å�°è¾¹å¢ƒæˆ˜äº‰; traditional Chinese: 中å�°é‚Šå¢ƒæˆ°çˆ­; pinyin: ZhÅ�ng-Yìn BiÄ�njìng ZhànzhÄ“ng; Hindi: भारत-चीन यà¥�दà¥�ध      BhÄ�rat-ChÄ«n Yuddh), also known as the Sino-Indian Border Conflict, was a war between People\'s Republic of China and India. The initial cause of the conflict was a disputed region of the Himalayan border in Arunachal Pradesh, known in China as South Tibet. Fighting began on 20 October 1962 between the People\'s Liberation Army and the Military of India. The first heavy engagement of the war was a Chinese attack on an Indian patrol north of the McMahon Line. The conflict eventually widened to include the region of Aksai Chin which the PRC regarded as a strategic link, via the China National Highway route G219, between the Chinese-administered territories of Tibet and Xinjiang. The war ended when the Chinese captured both disputed areas and unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, which went into effect at midnight.

The Sino-Indian War is notable for the harsh conditions under which much of the fighting took place, entailling large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4250 metres (14,000 feet).Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). The China-India Border War. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Retrieved on 2006-06-14. This presented numerous logistical problems for both sides.

The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future, and placed pressure on Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese invasion.

Location

China and India share a long border, sectioned into three stretches by Nepal and Bhutan, which follows the Himalayan mountains between Burma and Pakistan. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai Chin region, an area the size of Switzerland, that sits between the Chinese provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North East Frontier Agency). Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict.

Most combat took place at high altitudes. The Aksai Chin region is a vast desert of salt flats around 5000 metres above sea level, and Arunachal Pradesh is extremely mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7000 metres. According to military doctrine, to be successful an attacker generally requires a 3:1 ratio of numerical superiority over the defender; in mountain warfare this ratio should be considerably higher as the terrain favours defense. At the beginning of the war China took full advantage of this: the Chinese Army had possession of the highest ridges in the regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions also cause logistical and welfare difficulties; in past similar conflicts (such as the Italian Campaign of World War I) more casualties have been caused by the harsh conditions than enemy action. The Sino-Indian War was no different, with many troops on both sides dying in the freezing cold.

Background

Main articles: Sino-Indian relations and Origins of the Sino-Indian border dispute

The cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely-separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China\'s construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict. Arunachal Pradesh (called South Tibet by China) is also claimed by both nations—although it is roughly the size of Austria, it is sparsely inhabited (by numerous local tribes) due to its mountainous terrain.

The Johnson Line

The western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originates in 1834, with the Sikh Confederation\'s conquest of Ladakh. In 1842 the Sikh Confederacy, which at the time ruled over much of Northern India (including the frontier regions of Jammu and Kashmir), signed a treaty which guaranteed the integrity of its existing borders with its neighbours.The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp. 96–125. The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh, part of the Jammu and Kashmir region, to the British, and British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border. The boundaries at its two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well-defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay undefined.

In 1865, British surveyor W H Johnson came to an agreement with the Maharaja of Kashmir, in whose service he was employed,Obituary: Mr. W. H. Johnson. Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, New Monthly Series, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May, 1883) , pp. 291-293. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. on a proposed "Johnson Line" which placed Aksai Chin in Kashmir.Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan, "The Great India-China Game", Rediff, June 23, 2003. China rejected the arrangement, and the British government also harboured doubts, so decided to take up the issue in an attempt to reach a settlement. However in 1892, before the issue had been resolved, China erected boundary markers at Karakoram Pass on the ancient caravan route between Xinjiang and Ladakh.

Throughout most of the 19th century Great Britain and the expanding Russian Empire were jockeying for influence in Central Asia, and Britain decided to hand over Aksai Chin to Chinese administration as a buffer against Russian invasion. The newly-created border was known as the MacCartney-MacDonald Line, and both British-controlled India and China now began to show Aksai Chin as Chinese. In 1911 the Xinhai Revolution resulted in power shifts in China, and by 1918 (in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution) the British no longer saw merit in China\'s continuing possession of the region. On British maps the border was redrawn as the original Johnson Line, but despite this reversion the new border was left unmanned and undemarcated. According to Neville Maxwell, the British had used as many as 11 different boundary lines in the region, as their claims shifted with the political situationChina and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute. Neville Maxwell. The China Quarterly, No. 43. (Jul. – Sep., 1970), pp. 47–80. By the time of Indian independence in 1947, the Johnson Line had become India\'s official western boundary. On July 1, 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru definitively stated the Indian position.A.G. Noorani, "Fact of History", India\'s National Magazine, September 30, 2003. He claimed that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for centuries, and that the border (as defined by the Johnson Line) was non-negotiable. According to George N. Patterson, when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India\'s claims to the disputed area, "the quality of the Indian evidence was very poor, including some very dubious sources indeed".George W. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963Patterson, p. 275.

At the time, Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru\'s claims or made any opposition to Nehru\'s open declarations of control over Aksai Chin. In 1956, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that he had no claims over Indian controlled territory. He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction, implying that there was therefore no contradiction with his earlier statement since China did not regard the region as "Indian controlled", and that since the British hand-over China had regarded the McCartney MacDonald Line as the relevant border. Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty between any Chinese or Indian government, the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin\'s borders.

During the 1950s, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places. Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but access from India, which meant negotiating the Karakoram mountains, was more problematic. Consequently India did not even learn of the existence of the road until 1957 — finally confirmed when the road was shown in Chinese maps published the following year.

The McMahon Line

Main article: McMahon Line

In 1826 India and China gained a common border, including the area of what is now called Myanmar, following British annexations in the Anglo-Burmese Wars. In 1913, representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet attended a conference in Simla regarding the borders between Tibet, China and India. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, Beijing later objected to the proposed boundary between the regions of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet and did not ratify it. The details of the Indo-Tibetan boundary was not revealed to China at the time. The foreign secretary of the Indian government, Henry McMahon, who drew up the proposal, decided to bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet. According to later Indian claims, this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian. However, the McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims. India\'s government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent, and thus should be the modern boundaries of India while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient timesThe Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, Foreign Language Press of the People\'s Republic of China, 1961.

Months after the Simla agreement, China set up boundary markers south of the McMahon Line. T O\'Callaghan, an official in the Eastern Sector of the North East Frontier, relocated all these markers to a location slightly south of the McMahon Line, and then visited Rima to confirm with Tibetan officials that there was no Chinese influence in the area. The British-run Government of India intially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet "except through the intermediary of the Chinese government".GUPTA, Karunakar, "The McMahon Line 1911–45: The British Legacy", The China Quarterly, No. 47. (Jul. – Sep., 1971), pp. 521–45. The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921.Free Tibet Campaign, "Tibet Facts No.17: British Relations with Tibet". It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region.

China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make a such a treaty, rejecting Tibet\'s claims of independent rule. For its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town of Tawang, which the Line placed under British-Indian jurisdiction.Maxwell, Neville, India\'s China War, New York, Pantheon, 1970. However, up until World War II, Tibetan officials were allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority. Due to the increased threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period, British Indian troops secured the town as part of the defense of India\'s eastern border.

In the 1950s India began actively patrolling the region. It found that, at multiple locations, the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line. Given India\'s historic position that the original intent of the Line was to separate the two nations by the highest mountains in the world, in these locations India extended its forward posts northward to the ridges, regarding this move as compliant with the original border proposal, although the Simla Convention did not explicitly state this intention.

Indian military historian V.K. Singh argues that the basis of these boundaries, accepted by British India and Tibet, were that the historical boundaries of India were the Himalayas and the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian and associated with India. China also cited "traditional boundaries" as justification for its claims on areas south of the McMahon Line (then part of the North East Frontier Agency). However, according to Singh, these claims were unsupported by anyone other than China.VK Singh resolving the boundary dispute Both sides allege that the other\'s claims are founded on former imperial demarcations."The Place of International Law in Chinese Strategy and Tactics: The Case of the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute", by Arthur A. Stahnke. The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 30, No. 1, November 1970. pp. 95–119 The Chinese government regards Indian territorial claims as a continuation of imperialistic claims made by British India. Singh notes that India does not claim all areas which were previously under Indian Imperial Rule, such as those lands conquered by the Mauryans or Cholas.

Events leading up to war

Main article: Events leading to the Sino-Indian War

Tibet controversy

The Indian government\'s 1950 maps show the Sino-Indian border using undemarcated lines and the Aksai Chin frontier is labeled "boundary undefined".

The Indian government\'s 1954 maps unilaterally delimited the Sino-Indian border in the Aksai Chin, and Sino-Indian borders are no longer indicated as undemarcated.

The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the creation of India and the separate Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947, and the establishment of the People\'s Republic of China in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly-created PRC.

However, within a short time the PRC announced its intention to occupy Tibet, and later extended its influence by placing border posts within the Indian-claimed territory of Aksai Chin. India protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border. To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border. The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement, and in 1951 and 52, the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India.

In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo calling for India\'s borders to be clearly defined and demarcated:A.G. Noorani, "Fact of History", India\'s National Magazine, September 30, 2003. in line with previous Indian philosophy, Indian maps showed a border that, in some places, lay north of the McMahon Line.A.G. Noorani, "Perseverance in peace process", India\'s National Magazine, August 29, 2003. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in November 1956, again repeated Chinese assurances that the People\'s Republic had no claims on Indian territory, although official Chinese maps showed 120,000 square kilometres of territory claimed by India as Chinese. CIA documents created at the time revealed that Nehru had ignored Burmese premier Ba Swe when he warned Nehru to be cautious when dealing with Zhou.Chinese deception and Nehru\'s naivete led to 62 War Times of India They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India.

In 1950 the Chinese People\'s Liberation Army invaded Tibet and defeated the Tibetan Army, and the following year an agreement was ratified in Lhasa affirming China\'s sovereignty over Tibet. Maxwell, Neville (September 9, 2006). "Settlements and Disputes: China’s Approach to Territorial Issues". Economic and Political Weekly 41 (36): 3876. Retrieved on 2006-09-26.  Three years later, in 1954, China and India negotiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the Indian government under Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers). According to Harvard political analyst John W Garver, Nehru\'s policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalyzed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru\'s previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.

This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama, who was fleeing Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule. This was an act which, in China\'s eyes, eclipsed any former friendly gestures. Although Nehru\'s motives were humanitarian, from China\'s perspective India was interfering in its internal affairs and looking to gain influence in Tibet. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was humiliated and asked the Xinhua News Agency to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet. He further made it clear that the news should be anti-Nehru. Tensions continued to rise as Mao implied that the Lhasa uprising had been caused by Indians, and on 6 May 1959, Mao published "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru\'s Philosophy", where he accused Nehru of openly encouraging Tibetan rebels. India was branded as China\'s imperialist enemy. and Premier Zhou Enlai criticised Nehru\'s "class nature". However, India still hoped to negotiate. According to the Indian official history, India wished to demonstrate goodwill towards China and so put a stop to the Chinese claims of India\'s having hostile designs over Tibet. CIA documents created at the time have the view that Nehru was acting with naivete. They state that "Zhou played on Nehru\'s Asian, anti-imperialist mental attitude, his proclivity to temporize, and his sincere desire for an amicable Sino-Indian relationship." in a 5 year diplomatic effort by China to deceive Nehru into a sense of security.

Border incidents continued though this period. In August 1959, the Chinese army took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line, and two months later in Aksai Chin a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.

On October 2, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China\'s impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had expansionist designs over China. The PLA went so far as to prepare a self-defensive counterattack plan. However, Mao decided against further escalation because he feared the intervention of the United States.Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (2006), pp. 568, 579. Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made."The Shade of the Big Banyan" Time, Dec. 14, 1959.

As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line (see above), China\'s maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory. In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet. Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin; a position supported by the international community. India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate. China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet". India\'s adamance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point at which internal forces were pressurizing Nehru to take a military stance against China.CIA papers blame India for war with China Yahoo! — India News

At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General B M Kaul as army chief,Maxwell, Neville (April 2001). Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction. stratmag.com. Retrieved on 2006-08-18. but he refused to increase military spending and prepare for a possible war. That summer China\'s continuing patrols south of the McMahon Line provoked an Indian response known as the "Forward Policy". The aim of this policy was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies, forcing their return to China.Gregory Clark, "Remembering a War — The 1962 India-China Conflict", RediffIndia\'s Forward Policy, Review author[s]: A. G. Noorani, The China Quarterly © 1970 School of Oriental and African Studies There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line. China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet. According to the Indian official history, implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been patrolling. Kaul was confident, through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information, that China would not react with force. Indeed at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions. This led to a tit-for-tat Indian reaction, with both forces attempting to outmanoeuver each other. However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly.

By January 1962, Mao had lost much of his influence in China, and Chinese President Liu Shaoqi felt able to lead a public condemnation of Mao\'s disastrous Great Leap Forward Jung Chang writes that China was prepared for war by May to June after the border clashes, albeit that Chinese attention was also diverted at times by the nationalists in Formosa (Taiwan). Other authors including Roderik McFarquhar also state that the most immediate threat to China was from Taiwan.

Chinese studies as recently as the 1990s still support the position that India was planning aggression in Tibet. Most Chinese scholars agree that the root cause of the conflict was India\'s plan to seize Tibet and turn it into a protectorate or colony of India, to create a "Great Indian Empire". Zhao Weiwen, of the Chinese Ministry of State and Security, places emphasis on Nehru\'s "dark mentality". China\'s assumptions about Indian attitudes towards Tibet, whilst perhaps understandable from the Chinese perspective, are believed by most neutral observers to be fundamentally incorrect and a major contributory factor to the conflict. During the buildup to the war the Indian government largely maintained a policy of non-violent reaction and sought Indo-Chinese friendship, even to the point of failing to prepare for military action when its military leaders were recommending such precautions.

Early incidents

Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and fall of 1962. In May, the Indian Air Force was told not to ready itself for war, although it was assessed as being a feasible way to repel the unbalanced ratio of Chinese to Indian troops.CIA Journals 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on Air Power by R. Sukumaran In June, a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops. The Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along the border which could be a precursor to war.

During the period of June–July 1962, the Indian military planners began advocating "probing actions" against the Chinese, and accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines. According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold:

1. Test Chinese resolve and intentions regarding India.
2. Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-Indian war.
3. Create sympathy for India within the US, with whom relations had deteriorated after the Indian annexation of Goa.Patterson, p. 279

On July 10, 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post in Chushul but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker.Battle of Chushul On July 22, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory.History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992. Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defense, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened. In August, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and begun stockpiling ammunition, weapons and gasoline.

Confrontation at Thag La

In June 1962, Indian forces established an outpost at Dhola, on the southern slopes of the Thag La Ridge. Dhola lay north of the McMahon Line but south of the ridges India maintains the McMahon Line was supposed to represent.JOSHI Manoj, "Line of Defense", Times of India, October 21, 2000 In August, China issued diplomatic protests and began occupying positions at the top of Thag La. On September 8, a 60-strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola. Fire was not exchanged but Nehru said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory" and the troops had been given discretion to use force. On September 11, it was decided that "all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian territory".

However, the operation to retake Thagla was flawed in that Nehru\'s directives were unclear and it got underway very slowly because of this. In addition to this, each man had to carry 35 kg of luggage over the long trek and this severely slowed down the reaction. By the time the Indian battalion reached the point of conflict, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River. The Indian official history states that the Indian troops were given the discretion to fire if a conflict developed between the two sides. On September 20, Chinese troops threw grenades at Indian troops and a firefight developed, triggering a long series of skirmishes for the rest of September.

Some Indian troops, including Brigadier Dalvi who commanded the forces at Thag La, were also concerned that the territory they were fighting for was not strictly territory that "we should have been convinced was ours". According to Neville Maxwell, even members of the Indian defence ministry were categorically concerned with the validity of the fighting in Thag La.

On 3 October, a week before the triggering of the war, Zhou Enlai visited Nehru in New Delhi promising there would be no war. On October 4, Kaul assigned some troops with securing regions south of the Thagla Ridge. Kaul decided to first secure Yumtso La, a strategically important position, before re-entering the lost Dhola post. Kaul had then realised that the attack would be desperate and the Indian government tried to stop escalation into an all-out war. Indian troops travelling to Thagla had suffered in the previously unexperienced conditions, two Gurkha troops died of pulmonary edema.

On October 10, an Indian Punjabi patrol of 50 troops to Yumtso La were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1000 soldiers. Indian troops were in no position for battle, as Yumtso La was 16,000 feet (4,900 m) above sea level and Kaul did not plan on having artillery support for the troops. The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians under their belief that they were north of the McMahon Line. The Indians were surrounded by Chinese positions which used mortar fire. However, they managed to hold off the first Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties.

At this point, the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gun fire. However, Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire, as it would mean decimating the Rajput who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping. They helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a second assault. In the second Chinese assault, the Indians began their retreat, realising the situation was hopeless. The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties, with the Chinese suffering 33. The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honors, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers. This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war.

This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack on India, with massive troop buildups on the border. A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the buildup and reinforcement of positions south of the Thagla ridge.

Preparations for war

Motives

Two of the major factors leading up to China\'s eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India\'s stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in Tibet. There was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet" The other was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border. John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s, it was, nevertheless a major reason for China\'s going to war. However, he argues the Chinese perception of aggression to be "substantially accurate".

The CIA\'s recently declassified POLO documents reveal contemporary American analysis of Chinese motives during the war. According to this document, "Chinese apparently were motivated to attack by one primary consideration--their determination to retain the ground on which PLA forces stood in 1962 and to punish the Indians for trying to take that ground".

Another factor which affected China\'s decision for war with India was a perceived need to stop a Soviet-US-India encirclement and isolation of China. India\'s relations with the Soviet Union and United States were both strong at this time, but the Soviets were preoccupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis and would not interfere with the Sino-Indian War. P.B. Sinha suggests that China timed the war exactly in parallel with American actions so as to avoid any chance of American or Soviet involvement. American buildup of forces around Cuba occurred on the same day as the first major clash at Dhola while China\'s buildup between the 10th and 20th of October coincided exactly with the United States establishment of a blockade against Cuba which began on the 20th of October.

Garver argues that the Chinese correctly assessed Indian border policies, particularly the Forward Policy, as attempts for incremental seizure of Chinese-controlled territory. On Tibet, Garver argues that one of the major factors leading to China\'s decision for war with India was a common tendency of humans "to attribute others behavior to interior motivations, while attributing their own behavior to situational factors.". Studies from China published in the 1990s confirmed that the root cause for China going to war with India was the perceived aggression in Tibet, with the forward policy simply catalyzing the aggressive Chinese reaction.

Neville Maxwell and Allen Whiting argue that the Chinese leadership believed they were defending territory they believed to be legitimately Chinese, and which was already under de facto Chinese occupation prior to Indian advances, and regarded the Forward Policy as an Indian attempt at creeping annexation. Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in Chinese chess:

Insert the text of the quote here, without quotation marks.

The motive for the Forward Policy was to cut off the supply routes for Chinese troops posted in NEFA and Aksai Chin. According to the official Indian history, the forward policy was continued because of its initial success, as Chinese troops withdrew when they encountered areas already occupied by Indian troops. The Forward Policy was having success in cutting out supply lines of Chinese troops who had advanced South of the McMahon Line. However, the Forward Policy rested on the assumption that Chinese forces "were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so." No serious reappraisal of this policy took place even when Chinese forces ceased withdrawing.

By early 1962, the Chinese leadership began to fear that India\'s intentions were to launch a massive attack against Chinese troops, and that the Indian leadership wanted a war. In 1961, the Indian army had been sent into Goa, a small region without any other international borders apart from the Indian one, after Portugal refused to surrender the exclave colony to the Indian Union. Although this action met little to no international protest or opposition, China saw it as an example of India\'s expansionist nature, especially in light of heated rhetoric from Indian politicians. India\'s Home Minister declared, "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by it, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa. India will certainly drive out the Chinese forces", while another member of the Indian Congress Party pronounced, "India will take steps to end [Chinese] aggression on Indian soil just as she ended Portuguese aggression in Goa". By mid-1962, it was apparent to the Chinese leadership that negotiations had failed to make any progress, and the Forward Policy was increasingly perceived as a grave threat as Delhi increasingly sent probes deeper into border areas and cut off Chinese supply lines. Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi commented at one high-level meeting, "Nehru\'s forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death." The Chinese leadership believed that their restraint on the issue was being perceived by India as weakness, leading to continued provocations, and that a major counterblow was needed to stop perceived Indian aggression

Xu Yan, prominent Chinese military historian and professor at the PLA\'s National Defense University, gives an account of the Chinese leadership\'s decision to go to war. By late September 1962, the Chinese leadership had begun to reconsider their policy of "armed coexistence", which had failed to address their concerns with the forward policy and Tibet, and consider a large, decisive strike.

Military planning

The Indian side was confident war would not be triggered and made little preparations. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict.Swaminathan South Asia Analysis Group Lessons of 1962: A stock taking after 40 years. In August 1962, Brigadier D.K. Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out. Even in September 1962, when Indian troops were ordered to "expel the Chinese" from Thag La, Maj. General J.S. Dhillon expressed the opinion that "“experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away." Because of this, the Indian army was completely unprepared when the attack at Yumtso La occurred.

Recently declassified CIA documents which were compiled at the time reveal that India\'s estimates of Chinese capabilities made them neglect their military in favour of economic growth.China feared military coup in India during 60s DNA India It is claimed that if a more military-minded man had been in place instead of Nehru, India would have been more likely to have been ready for the threat from China.

On October 6, 1962, the Chinese leadership convened. Lin Biao reported that PLA intelligence units had determined that Indian units might assault Chinese positions at Thag La on October 10 (Operation Leghorn). The Chinese leadership and the Central Military Council decided upon war to launch a large-scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India. In Beijing, a larger meeting of Chinese military was convened in order to plan for the coming conflict

The Mao and the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war. A main assault would be launched in the eastern sector, which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector. All Indian troops within China\'s claimed territories in the eastern sector would be expelled, and the war would be ended with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal to prewar positions, followed by a return to the negotiating table.

Diplomatically, Mao acknowledged possible diplomatic isolation as the Soviet Union, the United States, the Republic of China and other "misinformed countries" would oppose China\'s actions. India led the Non-Aligned Movement, Nehru enjoyed international prestige, and China, with a larger military would be portrayed as an aggressor. However, he said that a well-fought war "will guarantee at least thirty years of peace" with India, and determined the benefits to offset the costs

On October 8, additional veteran and high-quality divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.

Marshal Liu Bocheng headed a group to determine the strategy for the war. He concluded that the opposing Indian troops were among India\'s best, and to achieve victory would require deploying crack troops and relying on force concentration to achieve decisive victory. On October 16th, this war plan was approved, and on the 18th, the final approval was given by the Politburo for a "self defensive counter-attack", scheduled for October 20.

Chinese offensive

On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People\'s Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart. In the western theater, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theater, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in Sikkim, a protectorate of India at that time. Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.

Eastern theatre

The disputed areas in the eastern sector

Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on October 20.Battle of Namka Chu The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river. The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and thus defended those crossings. The troops settled for the night on the banks of the river, awaiting an assault at dawn. However, the Chinese troops walked barefoot over the shallow October river and made their way to the other side. They gathered themselves up into battalions on the Indian-held south side of the river in the camouflage of the night, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs.

At 5:14 am, Chinese mortar fire began attacking the Indian positions. Simultaneously, the Chinese cut the Indian telephone lines so that the Indians could not make contact with CHQ. At about 6:30 am, the Chinese infantry, who had been positioned behind the Indians in the night, made their surprise attack and forced the Indians to leave their trench positions. Indian troops had four positions to defend, and most of these positions were defended for at least three waves of Chinese troops, inflicting heavy casualties.

Although multiple waves were repelled, the Chinese troops soon overwhelmed the Indians. Proceeding attacks from flanking positions south of the McMahon Line overwhelmed the Indian troops and caused withdrawal from Namka Chu. Fearful of more attacks, Indian troops also occupied positions at Tsang Le, which were inside Bhutan; Indian forces were told to ignore the international boundary. However, Chinese forces ignored Tsang Le. Now the Chinese troops had occupied the area which was under dispute in the confrontations at Thag La, but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA.

On October 22, at 12:15 am, the PLA launched a mortar attack on Walong, on the McMahon line.The Battle of Walong 400 troops proceeded to launch fire on the Assam rifles and Sikh regiment stationed there. Indian artillery fire brought the attack to a halt. The PLA then renewed the assault, but after a day of constant fire, the PLA retreated, having suffered 200 casualties with the Indians suffering only 9.

On October 23, the PLA once again tried to attack Walong. At 3:00 am, a Chinese soldier attempting to sneak up on Indian positions fell into the steep Namti Valley, alerting the Indians of Chinese presence. Proceeding lights fired by Indian troops showed the presence of numerous Chinese milling around the valley. The Indian mortars used their knowledge of the Chinese positions to bring down artillery fire which forced the end of the Chinese attack. Chinese forces then orchestrated the lighting of a bushfire that would cover their attack, but the fire was doused by Indian troops.

On October 23, Chinese troops launched a three-pronged attack on Tawang. However, India was already forced to evacuate posts in Tawang, so there was no defence or resistance. China took up positions in the posts by the next day.

On October 26, Chinese troops surrounded an Indian reconnaissance patrol and began a firefight. Chinese reinforcements soon encircled the Indian patrol, giving it no option of retreat. However, while the patrol held off, an Indian unit sneaked up behind the Chinese troops and caused them to break encirclement and fall into disarray, allowing the reinforcement of Indian troops in the region.

Western theatre

The disputed areas in the western sector

On the Aksai Chin front, China already controlled most of the disputed territory. However, some areas in which the Chinese claimed de facto control still had remnants of Indian troops.eg. Chip Chap Valley, Pangong On October 20, the Chinese forces launched attacks in the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake. A large number of these assaults were simply overrunning small outposts and garrisons stationed on the frontier. Many outposts and garrisons comprised a very small number of men and were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in these posts fought and were either killed or taken prisoner. The Galwan post had been surrounded by China in August and had received no land support from India since then. The surrounding Chinese forces shelled the post on October 20th, and it was never heard from again.

Late on October 19, Chinese troops launched various attacks throughout the western theatre. The Indian troops had no static defenses but still managed to hold position until dawn. By October 22, all Indian posts north of Chushul had been cleared of Indian presence.

Later on October 24, 120 officers and jawans of the Ahir Charlie Company of the 13 Kumaon Regiment were airlifted from Hyderabad to the Chushul sector.Men of Steel on Icy Heights Mohan Guruswamy Deccan Chronicle. They were deployed on the Rezang La Ridge to defend an air strip from impending Chinese takeover.

After realizing the magnitude of the attack, Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn so that they could regroup and be ready if China probed south of their claim line.

Indian forces were hampered by their significant inferiority in numbers and lack of combat readiness. The Indian deployment covered a large area and Indian units required an airlift for more supplies. Nonetheless, they defended their posts in the early phase of the war until their commanders were replaced on government orders.